Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive Gap Technique by Kroer, Christian et al.
Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive
Gap Technique
Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, and Tuomas Sandholm
Department of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
{ckroer,gfarina,sandholm}@cs.cmu.edu
Abstract
There has been tremendous recent progress on equilibrium-finding algorithms for
zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games, but there has been a puz-
zling gap between theory and practice. First-order methods have significantly better
theoretical convergence rates than any counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR)
variant. Despite this, CFR variants have been favored in practice. Experiments with
first-order methods have only been conducted on small- and medium-sized games
because those methods are complicated to implement in this setting, and because
CFR variants have been enhanced extensively for over a decade they perform well
in practice. In this paper we show that a particular first-order method, a state-of-
the-art variant of the excessive gap technique—instantiated with the dilated entropy
distance function—can efficiently solve large real-world problems competitively
with CFR and its variants. We show this on large endgames encountered by the
Libratus poker AI, which recently beat top human poker specialist professionals
at no-limit Texas hold’em. We show experimental results on our variant of the
excessive gap technique as well as a prior version. We introduce a numerically
friendly implementation of the smoothed best response computation associated
with first-order methods for extensive-form game solving. We present, to our
knowledge, the first GPU implementation of a first-order method for extensive-
form games. We present comparisons of several excessive gap technique and CFR
variants.
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum extensive-form games (EFGs) are a general representation that enables one to
model a myriad of settings ranging from security to business to military to recreational. The Nash
equilibrium solution concept [22] prescribes a sound notion of rational play for this setting. It is also
robust in this class of game: if the opponent plays some other strategy than an equilibrium strategy,
that can only help us.
There has been tremendous recent progress on equilibrium-finding algorithms for extensive-form
zero-sum games. However, there has been a vexing gap between the theory and practice of equilibrium-
finding algorithms. In this paper we will help close that gap.
It is well-known that the strategy spaces of an extensive-form game can be transformed into convex
polytopes that allow a bilinear saddle-point formulation (BSPP) of the Nash equilibrium problem as
follows [26, 28, 16].
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉 (1)
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Problem (1) can be solved in a number of ways. Early on, von Stengel [28] showed that it can be
solved with a linear program (LP)—by taking the dual of the optimization problem faced by one
player (say the y player) when holding the strategy of the x player fixed, and injecting the primal
x-player constraints into the dual LP. This approach was used in early work on extensive-form
game solving, up to games of size 105 [15]. Gilpin and Sandholm [10] coupled it with lossless
abstraction in order to solve Rhode Island hold’em which has 109 nodes in the game tree. Since
then, LP approaches have fallen out of favor. The LP is often too large to fit in memory, and even
when it does fit the iterations of the simplex or interior-point methods used to solve the LP take too
long—even if only modest accuracy is required.
Instead, modern work on solving this game class in the large focuses on iterative methods that converge
to a Nash equilibrium in the limit. Two types of algorithms have been popular in particular: regret-
minimization algorithms based on counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) [29, 20, 1, 5, 21, 4], and
first-order methods (FOMs) based on combining a fast bilinear saddle-point problem (BSPP) solver
such as the excessive gap technique (EGT) [24] with an appropriate distance-generating function
(DGF) for EFG strategies [11, 17, 19, 18].
The CFR family has been most popular in practice so far. The CFR+ variant [27] was used to near-
optimally solve heads-up limit Texas hold’em [1], a game that has 1013 decision points after lossless
abstraction. CFR+ was also used for subgame solving in two recent man-machine competitions
where AIs beat human poker pros at no-limit Texas hold’em [21, 4]—a game that has 10161 decision
points (before abstraction) [12]. A variant of CFR was also used to compute the whole-game strategy
(aka. “blueprint” strategy) for Libratus, an AI that beat top specialist pros at that game [4].
CFR-based algorithms converge at a rate of 1√
T
, whereas some algorithms based on FOMs converge
at a rate of 1T . Despite this theoretically superior convergence rate, FOMs have had relatively
little adoption in practice. Comparisons of CFR-based algorithms and FOMs were conducted by
Kroer et al. [17] and Kroer et al. [19], where they found that a heuristic variant of EGT instantiated
with an appropriate distance measure is superior to CFR regret matching (RM) and CFR with
regret-matching+ (RM+) for small-to-medium-sized games.
In this paper, we present the first experiments on a large game—a real game played by humans—
showing that an aggressive variant of EGT instantiated with the DGF of Kroer et al. [19] is competitive
with the CFR family in practice. It outperforms CFR with RM+, although CFR+ is still slightly faster.
This is the first time that a FOM has been shown superior to any CFR variant on a real-world problem.
We show this on subgames encountered by Libratus. The Libratus agent solved an abstraction of the
full game of no-limit Texas hold’em ahead of time in order to obtain a “blueprint” strategy. During
play, Libratus then refined this blueprint strategy by solving subgames with significantly more detailed
abstractions in real time [4, 3]. Our experiments are on solving endgames encountered by Libratus in
the beginning of the fourth (“river” in poker lingo) betting round, with the full fine-grained abstraction
actually used by Libratus. This abstraction has no abstraction of cards, that is, the model captures all
aspects of the cards. There is abstraction of bet sizes to keep the branching factor reasonable; in our
experiments we use the exact full fine-grained betting abstraction that was used by Libratus. Thus we
show that it is possible to get the theoretically superior guarantee of FOMs while also getting strong
practical performance.
In order to make our approach practical, we introduce a number of practical techniques for running
FOMs on EFGs. In particular, we derive efficient and numerically friendly expressions for the
smoothed-best response (SBR) and prox mapping, two optimization subproblems that EGT solves at
every iteration. Furthermore, we introduce a GPU-based variant of these operations which allows us
to parallelize EGT iterations.
We show experiments for several variants of both EGT and CFR. For EGT, we consider two practical
variants, one that has the initial smoothing parameter set optimistically, and one that additionally
performs aggressive stepsizing. For CFR, we show experimental results for CFR with RM, RM+,
and CFR+ (i.e., CFR with linear averaging and RM+). We will describe these variants in detail in the
body of the paper. We conducted all the experiments on parallelized GPU code.
2
2 Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems
The computation of a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum imperfect-information EFG can be formulated
as the following bilinear saddle-point problem:
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉, (2)
where X ,Y are convex, compact sets in Euclidean spaces Ex, Ey. A is the sequence-form payoff
matrix and X ,Y are the sequence-form strategy spaces of Player 1 and 2, respectively.
Several FOMs with attractive convergence properties have been introduced for BSPPs [25, 24, 23, 8].
These methods rely on having some appropriate distance measure over X and Y , called a distance-
generating function (DGF). Generally, FOMs use the DGF to choose steps: given a gradient and a
scalar stepsize, a FOM moves in the negative gradient direction by finding the point that minimizes
the sum of the gradient and of the DGF evaluated at the new point. In other words, the next step can
be found by solving a regularized optimization problem, where long gradient steps are discouraged
by the DGF. For EGT on EFGs, the DGF can be interpreted as a smoothing function applied to the
best-response problems faced by the players.
Definition 1. A distance-generating function for X is a function d(x) : X → R which is convex and
continuous on X , admits continuous selection of subgradients on the set X ◦ = {x ∈ X : ∂d(x) 6= ∅},
and has strong convexity modulus ϕ w.r.t. ‖ · ‖. Distance-generating functions for Y are defined
analogously.
Given DGFs dX , dY forX ,Y with strong convexity moduli ϕX and ϕY respectively, we now describe
EGT [24] applied to (1). EGT forms two smoothed functions using the DGFs
fµy (x) = max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 − µydY , φµx(y) = min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉+ µxdX . (3)
These functions are smoothed approximations to the optimization problem faced by the x and y
player, respectively. The scalars µx, µy > 0 are smoothness parameters denoting the amount of
smoothing applied. Let yµy (x) and xµx(y) refer to the y and x values attaining the optima in (3).
These can be thought of as smoothed best responses. Nesterov [25] shows that the gradients of the
functions fµy (x) and φµx(y) exist and are Lipschitz continuous. The gradient operators and Lipschitz
constants are
∇fµy (x) = a1 +Ayµy (x), ∇φµx(y) = a2 +A>xµx(y),
L1
(
fµy
)
=
‖A‖2
ϕYµy
, L2 (φµx) =
‖A‖2
ϕXµx
,
where ‖A‖ is the `1-norm operator norm.
Let the convex conjugate of dX : X → R be denoted by d∗X (g) = maxx∈X gTx−d(x). The gradient∇d∗(g) of the conjugate then gives the solution to the smoothed-best-response problem.
Based on this setup, EGT minimizes the following saddle-point residual, which is equal to the sum of
regrets for the players.
sad(x
t, yt) = max
y∈Y
(xt)TAy −min
x∈X
xTAyt
The idea behind EGT is to maintain the excessive gap condition (EGC), EGV(x, y) := φµx(y) −
fµy (x) > 0. The EGC implies a bound on the saddle-point residual: sad(x
t, yt) ≤ µxΩX + µyΩY ,
where ΩX = maxx,x′ dX (x)− dX (x′), and ΩY defined analogously.
We formally state EGT [24] as Algorithm 1. The EGT algorithm alternates between taking steps
focused on X and Y . Algorithm 2 shows a single step focused on X . Steps focused on y are
analogous. Algorithm 1 shows how the alternating steps and stepsizes are computed, as well as how
initial points are selected.
Suppose the initial values µx, µy satisfy µx = ϕXL1(fµy ) . Then, at every iteration t ≥ 1 of EGT,
the corresponding solution zt = [xt; yt] satisfies xt ∈ X , yt ∈ Y , the excessive gap condition is
maintained, and
sad(x
T , yT ) ≤ 4‖A‖
T + 1
√
ΩXΩY
ϕXϕY
.
Consequently, EGT has a convergence rate of O( 1T ) [24].
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Algorithm 1 EGT(DGF-center xω, DGF weights
µx, µy , and  > 0)
1: x0 = ∇d∗X
(
µ−1x ∇fµy (xω)
)
2: y0 = yµy (xω)
3: t = 0
4: while sad(xt, yt) >  do
5: τt = 2t+3
6: if t is even then
7: (µt+1x , xt+1, yt+1) = STEP(µtx, µty, xt, yt, τ)
8: else
9: (µt+1y , yt+1, xt+1) = STEP(µty, µtx, yt, xt, τ)
10: t = t+ 1
11: return xt, yt
Algorithm 2 STEP(µx, µy, x, y, τ )
1: xˆ = (1− τ)x+ τxµx(y)
2: y+ = (1− τ) y + τyµy (xˆ)
3: x˜ = ∇d∗X
(
∇dX (xµx(y))− τ(1−τ)µx∇fµy (xˆ)
)
4: x+ = (1− τ)x+ τ x˜
5: µ+x = (1− τ)µx
6: return µ+x , x+, y+
3 Treeplexes
Hoda et al. [11] introduced the treeplex, a class of convex polytopes that captures the sequence-form
of the strategy spaces in perfect-recall EFGs.
Definition 2. Treeplexes are defined recursively:
1. Basic sets: The standard simplex ∆m is a treeplex.
2. Cartesian product: If Q1, . . . , Qk are treeplexes, then Q1 × · · · ×Qk is a treeplex.
3. Branching: Given a treeplex P ⊆ [0, 1]p, a collection of treeplexes Q = {Q1, . . . , Qk}
where Qj ⊆ [0, 1]nj , and l = {l1, . . . , lk} ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, the set defined by
P l Q :=
{
(x, y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Rp+
∑
j nj : x ∈ P, y1 ∈ xl1 ·Q1, . . . , yk ∈ xlk ·Qk
}
is a treeplex. We say xlj is the branching variable for the treeplex Qj .
One interpretation of the treeplex is as a set of simplexes, where each simplex is weighted by the
value of the variable above it in the parent branching operation (or 1 if there is no branching operation
preceding the simplex). Thus the simplexes generally sum to the value of the parent rather than 1.
For a treeplex Q, we denote by SQ the index set of the set of simplexes contained in Q (in an EFG
SQ is the set of information sets belonging to the player). For each j ∈ SQ, the treeplex rooted
at the j-th simplex ∆j is referred to as Qj . Given vector q ∈ Q and simplex ∆j , we let Ij denote
the set of indices of q that correspond to the variables in ∆j and define qj to be the subvector of q
corresponding to the variables in Ij . For each simplex ∆j and branch i ∈ Ij , the set Dij represents
the set of indices of simplexes reached immediately after ∆j by taking branch i (in an EFG, Dij is the
set of potential next-step information sets for the player). Given a vector q ∈ Q, simplex ∆j , and
index i ∈ Ij , each child simplex ∆k for every k ∈ Dij is scaled by qi. For a given simplex ∆j , we let
pj denote the index in q of the parent branching variable qpj scaling ∆
j . We use the convention that
qpj = 1 if Q is such that no branching operation precedes ∆
j . For each j ∈ SQ, dj is the maximum
depth of the treeplex rooted at ∆j , that is, the maximum number of simplexes reachable through
a series of branching operations at ∆j . Then dQ gives the depth of Q. We use b
j
Q to identify the
number of branching operations preceding the j-th simplex in Q. We say that a simplex j such that
bjQ = 0 is a root simplex.
Figure 1 illustrates an example treeplex Q. This treeplex Q is constructed from nine two-to-three-
dimensional simplexes ∆1, . . . ,∆9. At level 1, we have two root simplexes, ∆1,∆2, obtained by a
Cartesian product operation (denoted by×). We have maximum depths d1 = 2, d2 = 1 beneath them.
Since there are no preceding branching operations, the parent variables for these simplexes ∆1 and
∆2 are qp1 = qp2 = 1. For ∆
1, the corresponding set of indices in the vector q is I1 = {1, 2}, while
for ∆2 we have I2 = {3, 4, 5}. At level 2, we have the simplexes ∆3, . . . ,∆7. The parent variable
of ∆3 is qp3 = q1; therefore, ∆
3 is scaled by the parent variable qp3 . Similarly, each of the simplexes
∆3, . . . ,∆7 is scaled by their parent variables qpj that the branching operation was performed on. So
4
on for ∆8 and ∆9 as well. The number of branching operations required to reach simplexes ∆1,∆3
and ∆8 is b1Q = 0, b
3
Q = 1 and b
8
Q = 2, respectively.
∆1
q2 ·∆4
q7 q8
q1 ·∆3
q6 ·∆8
q16 q17
q6 ·∆7
q13
q14
q15
q5 q6
q1 q2
∆2
q4 ·∆6
q11 q12
q3 ·∆5
q9 q10
q3 q4
×
×
Figure 1: An example treeplex constructed from 9 simplexes. Cartesian product operation is denoted
by ×.
4 Smoothed Best Responses
Let dj(x) =
∑
i∈Ij xi log xi + log n be the entropy DGF for the n-dimensional simplex ∆n, where
n is the dimension of the j’th simplex in Q. Kroer et al. [19] introduced the following DGF for Q
by dilating ds for each simplex in SQ and take their sum: d(q) =
∑
j∈SQ βjqpjdj
(
qj
qpj
)
, where
βj = 2 +
∑
k∈Dj 2βk. Other dilated DGFs for treeplexes were introduced by Hoda et al. [11] and
were also studied by Kroer et al. [17]. Kroer et al. [19] proved that this DGF is strongly convex
modulus 1M where M is the maximum value of the `1 norm over Q. EGT instantiated with this DGF
converges at a rate of LM
22d logn
T where L is the maximum entry in the payoff matrix, d is the depth
of the treeplex, and n is the maximum dimension of any individual simplex.
We now show how to solve (3) for this particular DGF. While it is known that this DGF has a
closed-form solution, this is the first time the approach has been shown in a paper. Furthermore, we
believe that our particular solution is novel, and leads to better control over numerical issues. The
problem we wish to solve is the following.
argmin
∑
j∈SQ
〈qj , gj〉+ βjqpjdj(qj/qpj ) = argmin
∑
j∈SQ
qpj (〈q¯j , gj〉+ βjdj(q¯j)) (4)
where the equality follows by the fact that qi = qpj q¯i. For a leaf simplex j, its corresponding term in
the summation has no dependence on any other part of the game tree except for the multiplication
by xpj (because none of its variables are parent to any other simplex). Because of this lack of
dependence, the expression
〈q¯j/qpj , gj〉+ βjdj(qj/qpj )
can be minimized independently as if it were an optimization problem over a simplex with variables
q¯j = xj/qpj (this was also pointed out in Proposition 3.4 in Hoda et al. [11]). We show how to
solve the optimization problem at a leaf: minq¯j∈∆j 〈q¯j , gj〉+βjdj(q¯j). Writing the Lagrangian with
respect to the simplex constraint and taking the derivative wrt. q¯i gives
min
q¯j
〈q¯j , gj〉+ βjdj(q¯j) + λ(1−
∑
i∈Ij
q¯i)⇒ gi + βj(1 + log q¯i) = λ⇒ q¯i ∝ e−gi/βj
This shows how to solve the smoothed-best-response problem at a leaf. For an internal simplex j,
Proposition 3.4 of Hoda et al. [11] says that we can simply compute the value at all simplexes below
j, add the value to gj (this is easily seen from (4); each qi acts as a scalar on the value of all simplexes
after i), and proceed by induction. Letting |Ij | = n, we now simplify the objective function:
〈q¯j , gj〉+ βj(
∑
i∈Ij
(q¯i log q¯i) + log n) =
∑
i
(q¯i(gi + βj log q¯i)) + βj log n
=
∑
i
(q¯i(λ− βj)) + βj log n = λ− βj + βj log n,
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Algorithm 3 EGT/AS(DGF-center xω, DGF weights
µx, µy , and  > 0)
1: x0 = ∇d∗X
(
µ−1x ∇fµy (xω)
)
2: y0 = yµy (xω)
3: t = 0
4: τ = 1
2
5: while sad(xt, yt) >  do
6: if µx > µy then
7: (µt+1x , xt+1, yt+1, τ) = DECR(µtx, µty, xt, yt, τ)
8: else
9: (µt+1y , yt+1, xt+1, τ) = DECR(µty, µtx, yt, xt, τ)
10: t = t+ 1
11: return xt, yt
Algorithm 4 DECR(µx, µy, x, y, τ )
1: (µ+x , x+, y+) = STEP(µx, µy, x, y, τ)
2: while EGV(x, y) < 0 do
3: τ = 1
2
τ
4: (µ+x , x+, y+) = STEP(µx, µy, x, y, τ)
5: return µ+x xt, yt, τ
where the last two equalities follow first by applying our derivation for λ and then the fact that q¯j
sums to one. This shows that we can choose an arbitrary index i ∈ Ij and propagate the value
gi + βj log q¯i + βj log n. In particular, for numerical reasons we choose the one that maximizes q¯i.
In addition to smoothed best responses, fast FOMs usually also require computation of proximal
mappings, which are solutions to argminq∈Q 〈q, g〉 + D(q‖q′), where D(q‖q′) = d(q) − d(q′) −
〈∇d(q′), q − q′〉 is the Bregman divergence associated with the chosen DGF d. Unlike the smoothed
best response, we are usually only interested in the minimizing solution and not the associated value.
Therefore we can drop terms that do not depend on q and the problem reduces to argminq∈Q 〈q, g〉+
d(q) − 〈∇d(q′), q〉, which can be solved with our smoothed best response approach by using the
shifted gradient g˜ = g −∇d(q′). This has one potential numerical pitfall: the DGF-gradient∇d(q′)
may be unstable near the boundary of Q, for example because the entropy DGF-gradient requires
taking logarithms. It is possible to derive a separate expression for the proximal mapping that is
similar to what we did for the smoothed best response; this expression can help avoid this issue.
However, because we only care about getting the optimal solution, not the value associated with it,
this is not necessary. The large gradients near the boundary only affect the solution by setting bad
actions too close to zero, which does not seem to affect performance.
5 Practical EGT
Rather than the overly conservative stepsize and µ parameters suggested in the theory for EGT we
use more practical variants combining practical techniques from Kroer et al. [19] and Hoda et al.
[11]. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 3. As in Kroer et al. [19] we use a practically-tuned
initial choice for the initial smoothing parameters µ. Furthermore, rather than alternating the steps on
players 1 and 2, we always call STEP on the player with a higher µ value (this choice is somewhat
reminiscent of the µ-balancing heuristic employed by Hoda et al. [11] although our approach avoids
an additional fitting step). The EGT algorithm with a practically-tuned µ and this µ balancing
heuristic will be denoted EGT in our experiments. In addition, we use an EGT variant that employs
the aggressive µ reduction technique introduced by Hoda et al. [11]. Aggressive µ reduction uses
the observation that the original EGT stepsize choices, which are τ = 23+t , are chosen to guarantee
the excessive gap condition, but may be overly conservative. Instead, aggressive µ reduction simply
maintains some current τ , initially set to 0.5, and tries to apply the same stepsize τ repeatedly. After
every step, we check that the excessive gap condition still holds; if it does not hold then we backtrack,
τ is decreased, and we repeat the process. A τ that maintains the condition is always guaranteed to
exist by Theorem 2 of Nesterov [24]. The pseudocode for this is given in Algorithm 4. EGT with
aggressive µ reduction, a practically tuned initial µ, and µ balancing, will be denoted EGT/AS in our
experiments.
6 Algorithm Implementation
To compute smoothed best responses, we use a parallelization scheme. We parallelize across the
initial Cartesian product of treeplexes at the root. As long as this Cartesian product is wide enough,
the smoothed best response computation will take full advantage of parallelization. This is a common
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structure in real-world problems, for example representing the starting hand in poker, or some
stochastic private state of each player in other applications. This parallelization scheme also works
for gradient computation based on tree traversal. However, in this paper we do gradient computation
by writing down a sparse payoff matrix using CUDA’s sparse library and let CUDA parallelize the
gradient computation.
For poker-specific applications (and certain other games where utilities decompose nicely based on
private information) it is possible to speed up the gradient computation substantially by employing the
accelerated tree traversal of Johanson et al. [13]. We did not use this technique. In our experiments,
the majority of time is spent in gradient computation, so this acceleration is likely to affect all
the tested algorithms equally. Furthermore, since the technique is specific to games with certain
structures, our experiments give a better estimate of general EFG-solving performance.
7 Experiments
We now present experimental results on running all the previously described algorithms on a GPU.
All experiments were run on a Google Cloud instance with an NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPU with 12GB
available. All code was implemented in C++ using CUDA for GPU operations, and cuSPARSE
for the sparse payoff matrix. We compare against several CFR variants.1 We run CFR with RM
(CFR(RM)), RM+ (CFR(RM+)), and CFR+ which is CFR with RM+ and a linear averaging scheme.
We now describe these variants. Detailed descriptions can also be found in Zinkevich et al. [29] and
Tammelin et al. [27].
Our experiments are conducted on real large-scale “river” endgames faced by the Libratus AI [4].
Libratus was created for the game of heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em. Libratus was constructed by
first computing a “blueprint” strategy for the whole game (based on abstraction and Monte-Carlo
CFR [20]). Then, during play, Libratus would solve endgames that are reached using a significantly
finer-grained abstraction. In particular, those endgames have no card abstraction, and they have a
fine-grained betting abstraction. For the beginning of the subgame, the blueprint strategy gives a
conditional distribution over hands for each player. The subgame is constructed by having a Chance
node deal out hands according to this conditional distribution.2
A subgame is structured and parameterized as follows. The game is parameterized by the conditional
distribution over hands for each player, current pot size, board state (5 cards dealt to the board), and a
betting abstraction. First, Chance deals out hands to the two players according to the conditional hand
distribution. Then, Libratus has the choice of folding, checking, or betting by a number of multipliers
of the pot size: 0.25x, 0.5x, 1x, 2x, 4x, 8x, and all-in. If Libratus checks and the other player bets
then Libratus has the choice of folding, calling (i.e. matching the bet and ending the betting), or
raising by pot multipliers 0.4x, 0.7x, 1.1x, 2x, and all-in. If Libratus bets and the other player raises
Libratus can fold, call, or raise by 0.4x, 0.7x, 2x, and all-in. Finally when facing subsequent raises
Libratus can fold, call, or raise by 0.7x and all-in. When faced with an initial check, the opponent can
fold, check, or raise by 0.5x, 0.75x, 1x, and all-in. When faced with an initial bet the opponent can
fold, call, or raise by 0.7x, 1.1x, and all-in. When faced with subsequent raises the opponent can fold,
call, or raise by 0.7x and all-in. The game ends whenever a player folds (the other player wins all
money in the pot), calls (a showdown occurs), or both players check as their first action of the game
(a showdown occurs). In a showdown the player with the better hands wins the pot. The pot is split in
case of a tie. (For our experiments we used endgames where it is Libratus’s turn to move first.)
We conducted experiments on two river endgames extracted from Libratus play: Endgame 2 and
Endgame 7. Endgame 2 has a pot of size 2100 at the beginning of the river endgame. It has dimension
140k and 144k for Libratus and the opponent, respectively, and 176M leaves in the games tree.
Endgame 7 has a pot of size $3750 at the beginning of the river subgame. It has dimension 43k and
86k for the players, and 54M leaves.
In the first set of experiments we look at the per-iteration performance of each algorithm. The
results are shown in Figure 2. The y-axis shows the sum of the regrets for each player, that is, how
1All variants use the alternating updates scheme.
2Libratus used two different subgame-solving techniques, one “unsafe” and one “safe” [3]. The computational
problem in the two is essentially identical. We experiment with the “unsafe” version, which uses the prior
distributions described here.
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Figure 2: Solution quality as a function of the number of iterations for all algorithms on two river
subgames. The solution quality is given as the sum of regrets for the players in milli-big-blinds.
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Figure 3: Solution quality as a function of the number of gradient computations for all algorithms
on two river subgames. The solution quality is given as the sum of regrets for the players in
milli-big-blinds.
much utility they can gain by playing a best response rather than their current strategy. The unit
is milli-big-blinds (mbb); at the beginning of the original poker game, Libratus, as the “big blind”,
put in $100 and the opponent put in $50, in order to induce betting. Mbb is a thousandth of the
big blind value, that is, 10 cents. This is a standard unit used in research that uses poker games for
evaluation. One mbb is often considered the convergence goal. CFR+ and EGT/AS perform the best;
both reach the goal of 1mbb after about 400 iterations in both Endgame 2 and 7. EGT, CFR(RM),
and CFR(RM+) all take about 3000 iterations to reach 1mbb in Endgame 7. In Endgame 2, EGT
is slowest, although the slope is steeper than for CFR(RM) and CFR(RM+). We suspect that better
initialization of EGT could lead to it beating both algorithms. Note also that EGT was shown better
than CFR(RM) and CFR(RM+) by Kroer et al. [19] in the smaller game of Leduc hold’em with an
automated µ-tuning approach. Their results further suggest that better initialization may help enhance
converge speed significantly.
One issue with per-iteration convergence rates is that the algorithms do not perform the same amount
of work per iteration. All CFR variants in our experiments compute 2 gradients per iteration, whereas
EGT computes 3, and EGT/AS computes 4 (the additional gradient computation is needed in order
to evaluate the excessive gap). Furthermore, EGT/AS may use additional gradient computations if
the excessive gap check fails and a smaller τ is tried (in our experiments about 15 adjustments were
needed). In our second set of plots, we show the convergence rate as a function of the total number
of gradient computations performed by the algorithm. This is shown in Figure 3. By this measure,
EGT/AS and EGT perform slightly worse relative to their performance as measured by iteration
count. In particular, CFR+ takes about 800 gradient computations in order to reach 1mbb in either
game, whereas EGT/AS takes about 1800.
In our experiments CFR+ vastly outperforms its theoretical convergence rate (in fact, every CFR
variant does significantly better than the theory predicts, but CFR+ especially so). However, CFR+
is known to eventually reach a point where it slows down and performs worse than 1T . In our
experiments we start to see CFR+ slowing down towards the end of Endgame 7. EGT, in contrast,
is guaranteed to maintain a rate of 1T , and so may be preferable if a guarantee against slowdown is
desired or high precision is needed.
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8 Conclusions and Future Research
We introduced a practical variant of the EGT algorithm that employs aggressive stepsizes, µ balancing,
a numerically-friendly smoothed-best-response algorithm, parallelization via Cartesian product
operations at the root of the strategy treeplex, and a GPU implementation. We showed for the first
time, via experiments on real large-scale Libratus endgames, that FOMs (with the dilated entropy
DGF) are competitive with the CFR family of algorithms. Specifically, they outperform the other
CFR variants and are close in efficiency to CFR+. Our best variant of EGT can solve subgames to
the desired accuracy at a speed that is within a factor of two of CFR+.
Our results suggest that it may be possible to make FOMs faster than CFR+. For example, we did not
spend much effort tuning the parameters of EGT, and tuning them would make the algorithm even
more efficient. Second, we only investigated EGT, which has been most popular FOM in EFG solving.
However, it is possible that other FOMs such as mirror prox [23] or the primal-dual algorithm by
Chambolle and Pock [8] could be made even faster.
Furthermore, stochastic FOMs (i.e., ones where the gradient is approximated by sampling to make
the gradient computation dramatically faster) could be investigated as well. Kroer et al. [17] tried this
using stochastic mirror prox [14] without practical success, but it is likely that this approach could be
made better with more engineering.
It would also be interesting to compare our EGT approach to CFR algorithms for computing equi-
librium refinements, for example in the approximate extensive-form perfect equilibrium model
investigated by Kroer et al. [18] and Farina et al. [9].
Pruning techniques (for temporarily skipping parts of the game tree on some iterations) have been
shown effective for both CFR and EGT-like algorithms, and could potentially be incorporated as
well [20, 6, 2].
Finally, while EGT, as well as other FOM-based approaches to computing zero-sum Nash equilibria,
are not applicable to the computation of general-sum Nash equilibria in theory they could still be
applied to the computation of strategies in practice (gradients can still be computed, and so the
smoothed best responses and corresponding strategy updates are still well-defined). For CFR the
analogous approach seems to perform reasonably well [7], and you might expect the same from
FOMs such as EGT.
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A Prox shift
We want to find a simple, numerically-friendly expression for
−d(q) + 〈∇d(q), q〉
First we derive an expression for 〈∇d(q), q〉. Let i ∈ Ij and nj be the dimensionality of simplex j.
Taking derivatives we have
∇jid(q) = βj(log qi
qpj
+ 1) +
∑
k∈Dij
βk
(
log nk −
∑
i′∈Ik
xi′
xpk
)
= βj(log
qi
qpj
+ 1) +
∑
k∈Dij
βk (log nk − 1)
Taking the inner product with q gives
〈∇d(q), q〉 =
∑
j∈SQ;i∈Ij
qi
βj(log qi
qpj
+ 1) +
∑
k∈Dij
βk (log nk − 1)

Subtracting −d(q) gives
−d(q) + 〈∇d(q), q〉 = −
∑
j∈SQ;i∈Ij
βjqi log
qi
qpj
−
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj log(nj)
+
∑
j∈SQ;i∈Ij
qi
βj(log qi
qpj
+ 1) +
∑
k∈Dij
βk (log nk − 1)

=
∑
j∈SQ;i∈Ij
qiβj +
∑
j∈SQ
∑
k∈Dij
qpkβk (log nk − 1)−
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj log(nj)
=
∑
j∈SQ
qpjβj +
∑
j∈SQ
∑
k∈Dij
qpkβk (log nk − 1)−
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj log(nj)
=
∑
j∈SQ
∑
k∈Dij
qpkβk (log nk − 1)−
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj (log(nj)− 1)
=−
∑
j∈SQ;bjQ=0
βjqpj (log(nj)− 1)
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